Introduction

HE FIRST international meeting to set standards for data communications was held in
Paris in 1865, to discuss interconnection of telegraph systems. Since that time, an elaborate network of institutions and procedures have grown up which attempt to coordinate the development of standards for telecommunications in general and data communications in particular. The convergence of computers and communications technology in the 1970s, coupled with changes in the political and economic environment of these industries have forced dramatic changes in both the role of standards, and the processes by which standards are developed. In this paper, we shall outline the broad directions of these changes, and illustrate them with a detailed examination of the development of the packet switching standard, X.25.
The Nature and Function of Standards
Standards are of many types: the IBM Personal Computer Technical Reference defines a de facto standard for personal computers. Bell Communications Research procurement specifications represent another type of standards document. More typically, however, when we think of standards we think of formal documents certified by a self-defined, standards-making body. Groups engaged in formal standards setting include international agencies, national standards bodies, professional associations, trade associations, government regulatory agencies, and cabinet departments and bureaus. Standards may, but usually do not, have the force of law; generally, they represent voluntary agreements among producers.
While a standard can be thought of as a document, it also involves a set of behaviors and a process. Firms may build compatible devices, though what is required for compatibility is nowhere written down. Conversely, because a standard has been reduced to writing, this does not mean that firms have agreed to abide by it. Standardization is theprocess of developing the consensus among firms and the patterns of behavior that will achieve the ultimate goals of a standard, not just the production of a document.
In the area of computers and communications there are two principal functions of standards: compatibility and variety reduction [I] . Compatibility (or interchangeability) standards are necessary for complementary products, manufactured by different producers, to work together. Railroad gauges and boxcar axles, light bulbs and sockets, data terminal equipment (DTE) and data circuit-terminating equipment (DCE) will not work together unless they are compatible.
Variety reduction, limiting the number of versions of a product, may be essential for producers to achieve potential economies of scale. A local area network (LAN) standard may be necessary to induce chipmakers to invest in VLSl implementations of a locahetwork .protocol. Without a standard, they would be skeptical of achieving sufficient production volumes to justify the front end investment in chip design. Variety reduction can also lead to economies of stocking and distribution through reduced inventory holdings [2] . The absence of a standard for 51/4-inch floppy disks means that software dealers must stock programs in multiple versions for each possible system.
While the compatibility and variety reduction functions are often closely related, they are not the same. Maximum compatibility would require a single local area network protocol, but available economies of scale in chip manufacturing may be achievable where the same chip can be used for different protocols. The IBM PC Local Net uses the Intel Ethernet chip set, but is not compatible [3].
1. The functions or services provided by the two devices 2. the procedures used to provide the functions or services must be compatible; and must be compatible.
Identical functions provided
via different procedures can often be made compatible through a simple software conversion. If the provided functions are different, an exact translation may not be possible. Additional functionality usually means higher costs, either for the end equipment or for research and development. Functionality may also be critical to achieving market acceptance by the end user. As a consequence, arguments over what functionality to include in a standard are usually the most contentious.
Economic Theory of Standards
The economic motivation for standards will be different depending upon the goal of the standard-compatibilty of variety reduction-and depending upon the economic positions of the participants in the standards process.
In the absence of economies of scale in production or inventory, there is no incentive to seek variety reduction standards. Similarly, there will be a demand for compatibility only if users wish to communicate or share information with a wide range of other users, and if the costs of translation, or multiple basic equipment sets, is significant.
The market structure of both buyers and sellers is clearly relevant to the incentives for standardization. Users often pay dearly for the absence of standards; thus, they should be the principal supporters of standardization. Buyers may be fragmented, however, and unable to coordinate their demands. Where buyers are few and powerful, they can more easily exert pressure on sellers to standardize, or force standards by coordinating their purchase specifications. Therefore, concentration among buyers should favor standardization.
Communications networks have significant externalities: the more people one can communicate with, the more valuable is the network. Where these externalities translate into increased demand for equipment which can access a larger portfolio, sellers have an incentive to standardize in order to increase the total size of the market.
Where sellers are fragmented, it may be difficult to coordinate the development of standards. Where there is one dominant firm and many small ones, we can expect de facto standards to be set by the dominant firm (absent patent, trade secret, or copyright protection which inhibits copying the dominant firm) [4] . Where sellers are few but of equal size, compatibility standards would act to reduce market power, and thus may be resisted. Integrated sellers who produce both primary and secondary products may resist standardization since it allows entry to competitors who produce only one of two conjoint products.
The coalescence of firms around a standard is a positive feedback process which results from the positive externalities of adopting the standard, which allows communications with the largest number of other users. Thus, smaller firms are led to fall in behind the standard of whichever firm or group of firms establishes the largest early following.
Standards Setting Process in Computers and Telecommunications
In the mid-1970s, the structures of the telecommunications and computer industries differed greatly. These differences included the legal charter of the participants, their economic motivations, the characteristics of the technology, and the characteristics of their technical and managerial employees. All of these differences contributed to quite different patterns of behavior with respect to standards.
Telecommunications
Telecommunication services have traditionally been provided by government agencies-Ministries of Posts, Telegraph, and Telephone (PTT's)-by nationalized firms such as Nippon Telephone and Telegraph, or by regulated private monopolies, such as AT&T. Until quite recently, the focus of these firms has been on the extension of basic telephone service to an ever greater faction of the population. From 1976 to 1983, the number of telephones in France increased from 7 million to 24 million. In most countries there was an unmet backlog of demand for basic service; consequently, telephone authorities have been more concerned with increasing supply, than designing and marketing new products or services. Technological change was confined primarily to the process of providing telecommunication services and not to the service product.
Telecommunication operations are characterized by large capital investments in highly reliable long-lived equipment. Telecommunications equipment is often depreciated over a period of 20-40 years and new technologies are introduced slowly; there is an absolute requirement that new equipment continue to work with the old.
Because of the specialized character of telecommunication sytems and the monopoly postion of most network operators, staff mobility at the technical and management levels has been low; in fact, most management spend all their working life with the same organization. Seniority is an important element for promotion, and therefore, middle technical managers are typically over 40.
As monopoly providers of telecommunications services, most have absolute authority to set their own standards at the national level. At the international level, they meet together as members of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to decide on interconnection arrangements between national networks. The manufacturers who supply equipment to the telecommunication carriers also participate, but they have no voting power. Technical standards (or Recommendations as they are formally known) are set by the International Consultative Committee for Telegraph and Telephone (CCITT), a permanent organ of the ITU. The CCITT meets every four years to agree on a program of work for its specialized study groups and approve new Recommendations. Detailed technical work is carried out by Working Parties or Special Rapporteurs.
Telecommunication standardization processes have traditionally been very stable, based on many decades of first-hand experience in international agreement-making.
The processes have been well-defined and understood by the participants [5]. The participants have also been a relatively homogenous tight-knit group with a rather conservative outlook. The absolute necessity for international standards to permit the interconnection of national networks has been a strong motivating factor in obtaining complete consensus on the standards developed, although there have been cases when some participants have placed more value on national goals than international ones, (for example, color television standards)
[6]. Typically, standards have only been approved after they have been implemented and tested; that is, the standardization process has relied heavily on compromises based on established de facto standards [7] . However, the process has not been able to cope well with situations in which participants already have a substantial commitment to a particular de facto standard (for example, the divergent U.S. and European standards for PCM).
The Computer Industry
The computer industry in the mid-1970s presented a completely different picture. Instead of stable, conservative, national monopolies, the computer industry was a dynamic, by a few large multinationals. The industry has been highly innovative and rapidly changes its product mix. The industry's dominant firm, IBM, rose to its position through its emphasis on marketing, rather than process technology. Most computer equipment has had a design life of 5-10 years; the rapid advances in microelectronic miniaturization and the corresponding rapid decline in costs has created a pressure on users to regularly upgrade their equipment. Unlike the telecommunication industry, the infrastructure required to support a computer system is relatively small. The people involved are also typically much younger than in the telecommunication industry age group) and have a much higher mobility-partly because of their age, but also because they possess more marketable skills.
Attempts at standards setting in the computer industry have been diffused and largely ineffectual. At the national level, standards have generally been coordinated by a single organization (for example, The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in the United States) but other organizations are encouraged to do the actual standards development work, including trade associations (for example, in the United States, the Electronic Industries Association (EIA)), and professional groups (the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)). Large computer users (for example, the Federal Government in the United States acting through the National Bureau of Standards) have also taken an active interest in the development of standards, and where necessary, have adopted their own standards.
Because the computer industry has been so dominated by IBM, consensus standards-setting procedures have been relatively unsuccessful. Only when there has been pressure from a large user (typically the government) has progress been made [4] . Because IBM has been a full line producer of both basic and complementary products, it has had little incentive to support standards which would have enabled smaller competitors to attack it in piecemeal fashion. Also, because early computers operated primarily as stand-alone devices, there was less incentive for standardization. Users could achieve internal standardization by buying from a single vendor; standardization on a larger scale brought few additional advantages. Rapid technological change also undermined efforts at standardization.
For example, in 1961 IBM was promoting its 6-bit code (BCD) as a U.S. standard interchange code, but only four years later had changed to support an 8-bit code (EBCDIC).
Changing Industry Structure and Its Effect on Standardization
Major changes in both technology and regulation altered dramatically the industry structure in both computers and communications during the 1970s. These changes affected the motivations for achieving data communication standards, and had a profound impact on the development of X.25.
Beginning with the Carterphone decision in 1968 and the Specialized Common Carrier decision in 1971, the U.S. began opening the telecommunications industry to competition. Within a few years, literally hundreds of companies would be offering a dazzling variety of customer premises equipmentincluding computer terminals and modems-while others would promise a host of new network services, including all digital farilities. This influx of new entrants challenged AT&T's traditional dominance of the US.' telecommunication standards process.
The computer industry also was witnessing a period of increased competition. Under the threat of an antitrust suit filed in 1969, and because of its failure to foresee the importance of the minicomputer market, IBM had lost share to a new group of companies such as Digital Equipment Corporation, Data General, and Prime. With continued growth, the industry also began to shift away from the model of large computer utilities based on handcrafted mainframes towards interconnected networks of hundreds or even thousands of mass produced machines. This transformation, made possible by the spectacular successes in microelectronics, made even more imperative the need for standards-not only for compatibility, but to achieve the economies of scale offered by VLSl technology.
VLSl technology allows extremely complex devices to be manufactured at very low unit cost; the challenge is to find a design needed in sufficient quantity to justify the front-end investments. Standards help create and define such needs. Once etched in silicon, however, standards are more difficult to change. Complex software-such as, for computer networking-exhibits similar economic characteristics: large design Costs and low reproduction costs. Unlike hardware, however, software-based standards are easier to modify and evolve, posing problems in the stability of standards once they are codified.
These changes in technology and regulation have affected the standards process in several ways. The shift from standards primarily for reasons of compatibility towards standards for variety reduction altered the motivations of the participants. The need to define a standard in order to create a market, as opposed to interconnect two national markets leads to:
I . Pressures to accelerate the standards process for commercial reasons.
2. Definition of standards in parallel with research and development on the underlying technology.
3.
Increased risks of problems in the resultant standards due to hasty development.
4.
The absence of market experience making difficult the resolution of controversies over the appropriate level of functionality to incorporate in the standard.
Finally, deregulation and the convergence of computers and communications has vastly increased the number of players. The larger set of needs to be satisfied increases the risk that either no standard will be agreed to, or some significant group of users will find the resulting standard unacceptable.
As a result of deregulation in the telecommunications industry and a shift towards mass production and increased competition in computers, the standards processes in these industries came under heavy pressure just as packet networks were being developed.
Computer Communications and Packet Switching
Early computer systems were quite independent of each other and therefore the development of the industry was not constrained by the absence of standards. Even early timesharing computer systems with remote terminals were still relatively self-contained: Typically, both the central processor and the remote terminals would be supplied by the same manufacturer (or equipment supplied by other manufacturers would copy the de facto standard of the principal supplier). However, some standards were required to interface computers with the communications network, such as modems. The single critical need for standards was at the interface between the computer terminal and the communications line which linked remote terminals to the computer. Through their control over "foreign attachments" to the network, the telephone administrations were in a position to determine standards for the modems which converted digital bitstreams into analog signals suitable for the voice network.
But, voice telephone circuits are costly to the data communications user and totally inadequate for high speed, errorfree data communications. During the late 1960s, the concept of packet switching emerged as a solution to the problem of March 1985-Vo1. 23 . No. 3 IEEE Communications Magazine providing efficient, error-free service to computers sending "bursty" traffic. Packet switching systems transmit data by means of addressed packets, such as groups of binary digits which include both data and calf control information. These packets occupy the transmission channel for the duration of the transmission of the packet only. The channel then becomes available for use by packets being transferred between different data terminal equipment. Packet switching became economically viable, largely because the cost of computer processing needed to create, process, and switch packets was declining at a much faster rate than that of communications channels. Therefore, it became cost effective to use computer-based switching to make more efficient use of the channel.
There are two distinctly different ways to organize the provision of packet switching service-connection-oriented or connectionless. These are often referred to as virtual circuits vs. datagrams.
Datagram service-In a connectionless datagram network, each packet carries the full address of the destination and is routed independently from the origin to destination terminal. As a result, packets may arrive out of sequence at the destination. Others may be corrupted in transit by errors, or even lost altogether. In a connectionless network, it is the responsibility of the endpoints to resequence packets or request retransmission of packets damaged in transit. Virtual circuit service-Is the logical equivalent of a physical circuit, or connection, between the source terminal and destination terminal. An originating terminal starts by sending a call origination packet that specifies the destination where subsequent data packets are to be sent. The call is assigned a short logical call number that can be used to specify where to send subsequent packets. The network takes responsibility for insuring that packets arrive in the correct sequence-as they would on a "circuit"-and for requesting retransmission of lost packets.
At the end of a virtual call, a clearing packet takes down the virtual circuit. As with leased lines in the telephone network, customers can be assigned "permanent virtual circuits" that are always in place.
As we shall see later, debates over virtual circuit vs. datagram service played an important role in the development of packet network standards. For a further discussion of the merits of virtual circuits vs. datagrams see [8-1 I].
Standards for Computer Networks
The exchange of data over a computer network requires agreement at many levels: from the physical interconnection of the computer to the communication line, to agreements on the meaning of the bits exchanged between computers at opposite ends of the network. Early in the development of packet networks it was recognized that a standard would be needed to define how a computer or terminal should connect to the network. This interface, between DTE's and DCE's, would mark the boundary between equipment provided by the carrier and equipment provided by the user, or the computer manufacturer.
The development of standards for this interface provides a dramatic illustration of the differences in process and motivations for standardization in the computer and the telecommunications industries.
A Case Study of X.25
The revolution in computers and communications has been so rapid, and computer communication networks are today so widespread, that it seems difficult to imagine that the M a r c h 1985-Vol. 23 . No. 3 IEEE C o m m u n i c a t i o n s M a g a z i n e ARPANET first demonstrated the possibilites of pacKer switching a mere 15 years ago. Indeed, what is striking about the. history of X.25 are the doubts that prevailed throughout the process as to the very need for public packet networks, and the possibilites of developing a successful standard. While X.25
can be viewed as a successful standard, there were many rough spots along the way.
X.25 Gets on the Standards Agenda
The need for special systems and standards for data communications was first recognized by the CCITT, with the creation of a Working Party in the late 1950s. At the 1960 Plenary Assembly, the Data Transmission Working Party was elevated to full study group status, and by 1964, the new study group had produced a set of recommendations dealing with data transmission over the telephone network. Most telephone administrations, however, expected circuit switched digital networks, carrying both voice and data, to meet the demand for data services and, ultimately, to be far more economical than building a separate packet network just for data. Voice communications generated the greater amount of traffic, and the idea of packet networks as the dominant technology for carrying both voice and data was-as it still isviewed as speculative.
In October 1972, the ARPANET was demonstrated at the first International Conference on Computer Communications, and according to Larry Roberts, then head of DARPA, converted many skeptics into believers [ 181. However, there was still a great deal of uncertainty among PTT's concerning the wisdom of establishing packet services: Standards would take too long to develop and computer manufacturers would be reluctant to make the necessary changes to their products to support a standard network interface.
Such skepticism did not deter, first, Packet Communications Inc., and then Telenet (a subsidiary of ARPANET builders, Bolt, Beranek and Newman) from seeking authority in the U.S. to establish public packet networks.
By April 1974, both had received approval, though PC1 soon dropped out when it had trouble raising capital.
In France, a decision to build a public packet switched network (TRANSPAC) 
Commercial Pressure for a Standard
Roberts, by now President of Telenet, favored virtual circuit service, largely for economic reasons. Simply routing packets represent only 10 percent of the value added of a packet network; providing virtual circuit service and other interface facilities would be the major contribution. With a datagram interface, the computer processing to resequence packets could be provided by the end user. A virtual circuit interface would force the customer to obtain-and pay for-these services from the carrier [9].
Technical arguments for choosing virtual circuit service were advanced as well. Roberts argued that a datagram network places the various network. control functions-for example, error control, flow control, packet sequencing-in the hands of the end user. As a result, the network can respond to overload situations only by throttling all traffic from an entire host, even if it is only one virtual circuit that is generating the overload condition [I 81.
Datagram proponents argued that the overhead involved in setting up a virtual circuit was wasted for simple point-of-sale, or automatic teller transactions, where one packet in each direction might be all that is required. Moreover, they argued that no matter how reliable the virtual circuit service is, users will feel they must protect themselves against the possibility of networks errors, by duplicating in the end computers much of the error correcting and packet sequencing facilities provided as part of a virtual circuit service. Finally, packet voice suffers less from an occasional lost or damaged packet in a datagram network than it does from the uncertainties in delivery delay associated with virtual circuits [29].
Faced with these arguments and recognizing that Telenet hardware for every brand of computer that wanted to use the network. With such a standard, the computer vendors themselves might eventually provide the necessary capability for their products to use packet networks. In particular, the Canadians were anxious to see a defined standard. While DATAPAC was not scheduled to come into operation until 1975, design decisions had to be made in 1974. Moreover, the growing interest in packet switching exhibited at the second ICCC in 1974 suggested that there would be many networks by the end of the subsequent CCITT study period in 1980. If a standard could not be agreed before the 1976 Plenary, then by 1980, each network would have been firmly committed to its own design, and the adoption of a new international standard would be both politically and economically unacceptable.
In his role as Assistant Vice-president for Planning of the Computer Communications Group in TCTS, Dave Horton began an international lobbying effort to press for the adoption of an interface standard. Horton realized that in order to influence the CCITT, he would first have to obtain support from other telecommunications administrations. A joint contribution would be more likely to gain acceptance than one submitted by a single administration. Horton began the process by issuing a glossy-covered specification of the proposed DATAPAC service and circulating it widely [28].
Virtual Circuits Versus Datagrams
Formal and Informal Processes
In January of 1975, a group from TCTS traveled to London, Paris, and Madrid to meet with their counterparts in the PTT's, and discuss the DATAPAC proposal. This was followed by a series of informal meetings during 1975, mainly involving TCTS and the French PTT, aimed at developing a draft standard. Although both groups were also participating in the formal CClTT meetings (See Table  I for a chronology of working group meetings), much of the drafting work was carried out informally. A total of ten such informal meetings, some lasting as long as a week, were held in 1975. By the end of the year, Telenet and the BPO were also drawn into these informal meetings. By this time, interest in packet nets had grown to where Rapporteur's Group meetings were drawing 40-50 people. (The same individuals were also representing their organizations in the Data Communications Subcommittee of the International Standards Organization's TC97, as well as in ANSI X3S37. Meetings of these groups provided additional settings for discussing X.25.)
National Delegations and Standing in the CCITT
As a treaty organization, it is States-and not companiesthat have official standing in the ITU. In the U.S., the Departments of State and Commerce organize study groups of U.S. firms to formulate a national Dosition for CClTT The TCTS draft called for a standard based on a datagram meetings. For all its enthusiasm, Telene; could not speak for mode of operation. However, Telenet was implementing a the U.S., and could not, on its own, advance its views directly. virtual circuit network, and the French R C P was also a virtual Indeed, until it received approval as a recognized public carrier circuit design. If there was to be a standard, it was clear to from the FCC in April 1974, it had no right even to attend Horton that agreement on this fundamental design choice was CCITT meetings. Throughout 1974 and 1975, the U.S. official imperative.
position-dominated by the skeptical views of AT&T-was that development and approval of an interface standard for packet switching was premature.
TCTS experienced similar problems in obtaining support from the official representative organization for the CCITT in Canada, the Canadian Telecommunications Carriers Association (CTCA). TCTS's proposals were opposed by a competitor, CNCP, who considered that the rapid development of a standard would not be in their business interest; consequently, TCTS's views could not be presented as the Canadian position. Thus, while Telenet and TCTS played key roles in drafting the eventual standard, the drafts had to be submitted as national contributions from France and the UK, whose positions were determined solely by their respective PTT's.
In 1974, the International Federation for Information Processing was granted category (d) membership in the CCITT. This meant that representatives of the I F l P Network Working Group 6.1 could participate in the CCITT in an advisory capacity. IFlP did submit a number of written contributions, and strongly supported the inclusion of a datagram service, but representatives to the CClTT meetings quickly discovered that they were quite powerless in the CClTT forum.
X.2.5 (1 976)
A first draft of X.25 was finally prepared by an informal drafting party in Ottawa in March, 1975-work that was subsequently confirmed in the May 1975 formal Rapporteur's meeting. Numerous informal meetings during the summer led to eight written contributions to the September Rapporteur's meeting, the last scheduled meeting of the 1973-76 study period.
Although there were a full 12 months remaining in the study period after September, there would be no opportunity for any more meetings at the Rapporteur level. The results of the meeting needed to be translated into the three working languages used by the CClTT and distributed before the final meeting of SG VI1 in February 1976. After the February SG VI1 meeting, there would be no opportunity for further change before formal ratification at the September 1976 CClTT Plenary Assembly. Thus t h e final meeting of the Rapporteur's Group was crucial: under traditional CClTT procedures, the decisions of this meeting would determine whether or not a standard would be adopted in 1976. 
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By the end of the September Rapporteur's meeting, however, there were still numerous unresolved issues: packet lengths. packet length indicators, call progress and advisory signals, "more data" indicator for virtual calls, datagram and virtual call flow control mechanisms [31] . Furthermore, the datagram/virtual call issue remained unresolved. Roberts had proposed to the meeting that the datagram classification be changed from "essential" to "additional." He was supported by representatives from France and TCTS. However, representatives from NTT, ISO, ECMA, USA and CTCA spoke against hasty action; as a result the point was left open. The final report of the Rapporteur's meeting made it seem doubtful that a standard would be ready for adoption by SG V11.
Immediately following the September 1975 Rapporteur's meeting (which lasted two days), TCTS, the French PTT, and Larry Roberts spent a further week in Geneva redrafting the X.25 proposal. In mid-October, TCTS and Telenet met for further discussions. At the end of October, Remi Desprks, from the French PTT, attended a meeting of I S 0 T C / 9 7 / S C 6 in Washington, D.C. While Desprks was in Washington, Roberts seized on the opportunity to arrange a further X.25 meeting.
A key issue in their discussion was flow control. Desprks supported flow control with local significance only (DTE-DCE); Roberts supported an end-to-end flow control significance (DTE-DTE). Despres also supported an explicit credit flow control scheme, while Roberts supported window rotation [32] . This conflict arose because of different implementations, in the Telenet and R C P networks. Initial attempts at resolving these differences failed, but with assistance from Anthony Rybczynski of TCTS a compromise was eventually reached by disguising some of the differences of opinion in the wording of the draft recommendation; for example, local flow control was mandated but end-to-end flow control was acceptable if desired by individual network providers. Everyone knew that such a loose specification would create problems when attempts were made to interconnect different networks in the future, but all were prepared to pay this price in the interests of getting the agreed portions of X.25 accepted.
The result of this meeting was a draft recommendation that TCTS, Telenet, the French PTT, and the BPO were prepared to support. That this agreement was tantamount to a standard was reflected in an article by Rybczynski (TCTS), Wessler (Telenet), Desprks (French PTT), and Wedlake (BPO) for the 1976 AFlPS National Computer Conference. Submitting their paper even before the SG VI1 meeting in February they described the draft standard as a fait accompli [33] .
Thus, by the end of 1975, with the exception of Spain, every administration and carrier who had either already established a public packet network or had made a commitment to do so was prepared to support the proposed X.25 standard. The Spanish RETD network had been in operation for almost five years and its national traffic continued to increase without the benefit of a standard DTE/DCE interface. Spain felt the development of X.25 was an "unstable study" and therefore had no intention of supporting it in their network.
Despite acceptance by the leading carriers, the draft still needed to be ratified by the 200 members from 20 countries represented in the SG VI1. During debate on the draft proposal many of the known problems surfaced. The official U.S. delegation was a particularly vocal critic; the U.S. position was that no standard should be accepted which had obvious technical flaws. The technical points of conflict were not resolved, but a document was agreed to after the U.S. delegation, under pressure from France, agreed to stop challenging the proposal. Consent by the U.S. was understood in return for French cooperation on unrelated issues at the Plenary. In September 1976 at the CClTT Plenary, the I I recommendations of SG VII-including X.25-were adopted unanimously, thus completing the formal process.
Problems and Revisions
Adoption of X.25 (1976) by the CCITT did not bring about immediate widespread support. Some saw it as little more than an "advertisement for a standard"
[34]. The participants themselves knew there were may ambiguities and unresolved issues. Two of these were of particular importance: alignment of link level of X.25 with the HDLC standard being developed by ISO, and datagram service.
X.25 had been developed using a draft IS0 HDLC procedure at the link level. The draft IS0 procedure was subsequently rejected when put to letter ballot and a modified proposal was developed. By early 1977, the IS0 had still not reached agreement on the portion of HDLC dealing with symmetrical and balanced classes of procedures which were of most interest to X .25 [35] .
In the unbalanced class of procedure, one station (designated the primary) has total responsibility for control of the link. This class had been strongly supported by IBM whose Systems Network Architecture was, at the time, designed to rely on a large central mainframe controlling dependent terminals. Over the opposition of IBM, this class had been extended to permit an asvnchronous response mode (ARM) in which a secondary may transmit without receiving explicit permission from the primary. The LAP in X.25 (1976) had been based on the ARM proposal. However, during balloting, potential deadlock problems were detected with the proposal [36], and a new balanced class of procedures was developed. For this class, no distinction is made between primary and secondary stations, thus giving both stations equal control over the link. A version of this mode, know as asynchronous bdanced mode (ABM) was proposed as a revised link access procedure for X.25, or LAPB.
To avoid the risk of further inconsistencies between CClTT and IS0 standards making, a joint meeting of CClTT SG VI1 experts and I S 0 TC/97 met in April 1977 to review their differences. Eventually a compromise, "mutually objectionable to both parties," [37] was reached.
Despite the compromise, the earlier LAP standard was "on the books" as the official X.25 link access protocol. There was a danger that both network developers and DTE vendors would continue implementing the old LAP protocol, leading to two camps with incompatible standards. Already, TCTS had adopted LAP in the DATAPAC network and by early 1977 had proceeded much too far in implementing its network to convert immediately to LAPB.
T o clarify that LAPB was the new preferred standard, a newly adopted CClTT letter ballot procedure for obtaining "Provisional Approval of Draft Recommendations" between Plenaries was used to ratify LAPB; fifteen administrations approved and three abstained.
At the February 1976 SG VI1 meeting it had been agreed to hold datagrams over for further study [39] . At the first meeting of SG V11 in 1977, the participants examined a proposal from Japan for a fast-select service [40,41]. The fast-select facility would allow the inclusion of user data in the call set up and call disconnect packets. Thus for small quantities of data-such as transaction data-the fast select facility would provide for a simple two packet exhange, much like a datagram service. However, fast select still requires the network to incur the overhead of virtual circuit set-up.
Support for inclusion of a datagram service in X.25 came primarily from IFIP Working Group 6.1 [42] and ANSI X3S37 [43,44]. I F l P represented the scientific community and their interest in a network service that provided maximum flexibility to the user. The ANSI position was formulated by a subgroup whose members represented ARPA, NCR, Xerox, and Western Union. Their support for datagram service was couched in economic terms, that is, that datagram service would be far
~381.
more cost effective for short transaction type traffic than would be virtual circuits. T o buttress their position, they conducted and published a survey of users and vendors on the desirability of a datagram interface [45] , and rallied additional support in 1SO TC97/SC6. The French countered with a proposal to use permanent virtual circuits as a means to provide a lowoverhead data exchange capability.
In February 1980, SG VI1 adopted a revised version of X. 25 (X.25(1980) ) that included datagram service and fast select as "additional," or optional services as opposed to "essential" parts of the standard. Inclusion of a datagram specification has turned out to be an empty gesture. In the absence of any obligation to implement datagram service, not a single public packet network operator has done so. X. 25( 1984) calls for the datagram option to be dropped altogether [46] . The fast select option has ljeen implemented only by NTT [47] .
Lessons From X.25
Louis Po(1zin has described the X.25 standardization process as a "well-e$gineered political coup" [48] .
A small, vighly motivated group of packet switching carriers developed a new standard in record-breaking time and persuaded ;L very conservative standards organization, the CCITT, to; accept its proposal. The process was "wellengineered": with respect to its timing and the mix of formal and informgl processes used. In 1975, there were a number of imminent public packet networks; adoption of a standard before implkmentation seemed to make good sense. X.25 was "political" i$ the sense that the most important issues at stake had little i o do with technical compatibility, the usual motivation ifor international telecommunication standardization. A DTE/DCE standard was needed to persuade computer mainframe and computer terminal manufacturers to produce equipment kompatible with the emerging packet networks.
A standard was also required so that telecommunication network providers could secure their claim for a share in the rapidly growing dat,a communication market. X.25 was a "coup" in the sense that !just when the institutional processes (the Rapporteur's grbup) seemed to be floundering, the informal group suddenly produced a completed draft proposal supported by a number of I telecommunication administrations and carriers. Furthermo(e, the group succeeded in gaining the approval of the CCITT.
I I
Evaluating X.25
Before we can draw any conclusions from the case of X.25 for other sthndards efforts, we must first establish whether or not X.25 ca:n be judged a "successful" standard. Success can be measured in two ways: first, by the extent of use of the standard and second, by a more subjective assessment of "technical &ality."
Over 30 dountries have public packet switching services-all X.25 compktible-while only a dozen countries offer circuit switched di'gital services [46] . Most administrations were able to take adkantage of the revised X.25 proposals developed during the i977-1980 CClTT study period; only four networks implemented the 1976 version of X.25, and it took until 1983 for Telenet /to fully convert to X.25 (1980) .
An impolrtant goal of the network providers was to induce terminal aqd computer equipment manufacturers to develop X.25 comp;ltible products: in this they have been successful. A survey of 60 computer and terminal manufacturers in 1978 showed 25 supdorting X.25 [49] . IBM offered support in 1978 in Europe, wlde waiting until 1981 in the U.S. [50] and by 1983, more than 1100 software packages had been certified by Telenet as conforming to X. 25 (1980 From a technical perspective, X.25 still has both its defenders and detractors. Most of the ambiguities of X. 25 (1976) were resolved by X. 25 (1980) , but in many cases the solution was to ratify multiple options or interpretations. As one particularly scathing critique by IBM put it, "The evolution of X.25 has presented somewhat of a moving target to network implementors and terminal designers alike" [52] . As a consequence, packet network services continue to differ significantly between countries (Table 11 ). This poses continuing problems for those writing X.25 host software.
The battle over datagram service, which was resolved by defining a datagram "option," ended in a clear defeat for datagram proponents. As noted earlier, no public network has offered datagram service, and revisions proposed for 1984 will eliminate datagrams from X.25 altogether.
X.25 is expensive for transaction traffic and cannot be used to support packet voice.
Critics such as Pouzin continue to fault X.25 for unwarranted complexity at the packet level. In 1976, Pouzin argued strenuously for the development of a common terminal interface for both circuit and packet switched networks based on the IS0 HDLC standard [53] . The introduction of a new LAPD protocol by AT&T for its videotex service is further evidence of the need for a simpler terminal protocol. On the balance, X. 25 (1976) must be seen as a technically weak standard, with X. 25 (1980) as better, but by no means ideal. Revisions scheduled for adoption in 1984 should finally permit X.25 to be used by microcomputers over the dial-up network.
Lessons
X.25 represents only one of the many standards for computer communications; it is risky to attempt to read too much into a single case: Nevertheless, we believe it may be instructive for future standards setting activities to draw several lessons from this history of X.25
Lesson I : An imperfect standard is better than none.
X. 25 (1976) was hurriedly adopted with known ambiguities. Networks-and their customers-who implemented the 1976 version, were obligated to modify their implementations to align with the 1980 version at significant expense. Yet, X.25 has been hailed by these same networks as a great success. From their perspective, X.25 succeeded in its most important objective: It induced equipment manufacturers to take packet networks seriously and to begin designing compatible equipment. By 1975, Tymnet, RETD, and Telenet had been established without an international standard interface. TCTS, the EEC, the BPO, and the French PTT had committed themselves to establish networks with or without a CCITT approved standard. If these networks had been allowed to evolve independently, the chances of reaching agreement later would have been drastically reduced.
X.25 suggests that economic and competitive pressures are forcing the rapid implementation of computer communications and that these new applications will be implemented with or without standards. If standards are to make a contribution to these technologies they must be developed on a compatible time scale. The typical eight year development cycle of I S 0 [46] . and CClTT is far too slow in the current competitive environment. The alternative, as suggested by X.25, is to sacrifice some of the standard's rigor in favor of more rapid approval. The direct consequence is a need for subsequent changes and revision. We would argue that the imperfections of X.25 were not an aberration; from a commercial perspective, a n imperfect standard is better than none. We can expect more hurriedly developed standards in the future, and more effort expended in subsequent revisions. The alternative, to delay the benefits of new technology while standards are refined, is perceived to be too costly in a competitive marketplace. X. 25 (1976) was approved when there were only 3 networks in operation, but as many as I5 under discussion for 1980. If a standard was to benefit those 15, it had to be developed for the 1976 CClTT Plenary. The leading role in the development was taken by TCTS, Transpac, and the BPO. The 3 networks already in operation-RETD, Telenet, and Tymnet-while agreeing to eventually conform, were less motivated to spearhead the development effort.
Conversely, without the experience of the three networks already in operation, plus the widely publicized ARPANET experience it would not have been possible to generate sufficient interest in packet networks to develop a standard. The firmly rooted circuit switching tradition in the telecommunications industry had caused some reluctance during the early 1970s on the part of the PTT's and carriers to establish public packet networks. But, by 1975 most had had sufficient exposure to the technology to recognize its potential. The fact that CClTT Plenary sessions are held only at four year intervals forced the proponents of a standard to move quickly in 1975 or face an additional four years delay.
The best time to develop a standard appears to be during a very narrow window after there is some operating experience, and when there has been a commitment by other organizations to enter the field, but before these same organizations have committed themselves to divergent approaches. The need for some operating experience before the standard is developed, means that the leading innovators may have to redesign their systems as Telenet, RETD, and Tymnet have been obliged to do. (Similar redesign has been forced on Ungermann-Bass, a pioneer in local area networks, and the British Prestel videotex system-both pioneers who got ahead of the standards making process.) Lesson 4: Managers who can commit their organizations will be more successful in securing adoption of a standard than technical experts without decision-making responsibility.
CCITT processses have traditionally been characterized by a separation of technical study groups from the more political Plenary meetings.
The usual CClTT participant is only an intermediary who must check with his chiefs before agreeing to any proposal. However, the effort to develop X.25 was led by top management from the key organizations: Horton was Assistant Vice-president (Planning) of the Computer Communications Group of TCTS, Kelley was Head of the Data Systems Division in the BPO, Roberts was President of Telenet, and Picard became Director General of Transpac. Because of the economic importance of standards to these fledgling networks, these managers took a direct interest. They had the authority to make commitments on behalf of their organizations which greatly accelerated the process.
Lesson 5: Standards agreements are more likely to be reached for "natural" interfaces, that is, interfaces where there is a natural division in responsibility for the supply of equipment or services.
Recommendation X.25 defines the interface between customer terminal equipment and the communications network. For public data services, customer equipment is generally provided by the user rather than the network provider, thus creating a division of responsibility and a ''natural" interface.
For "natural" interfaces, both sides can further their self interest by adopting a standard. Network operators are freed from providing multiple interfaces to many equipment providers. To the extent that users demand data terminal equipment capable of being used on public networks, equipment providers gain a larger market if their devices can be used interchangeably in many different countries without modification.
By contrast, host-to-host standards-for example, the 1SO's Transport Protocol-do not define a natural division of responsibility and were not finally agreed to until 1983.
Lesson 6: The layered approach speeds the development of standards.
Recommendation X.25 separates the various network functions at the DTE/DCE interface into a physical layer, a link layer, and a packet layer. In theory, layering allows standards 1 for each layer to be developed by separate working groups and is expected to facilitate changes to the standards as they evolve.
The history of X.25 suggests that layering does help. X.25 (1976) might not have been ready in time, except that the Study Group adopted a link access procedure and a physical level standard based on the IS0 HDLC proposals. In the event, 1SO subsequently rejected the proposed HDLC link access procedure. A compromise procedure (LAPB) was developed jointly by IS0 and the CClTT in 1977 and included in the revised version of X. 25 published in 1978. No changes were required at either the physical level or the packet level. The speed with which this revision was possible was due largely to the layered structure of the standard.
The success of the layering concept is reflected in the EO'S model for Open Systems Interconnection and in the activities of the IEEE's Local Area Network group, 802.
The cooperation with IS0 leads us to our final observation, namely: L.eSson 7: Standards of higher quality and greater generality are likely to be produced if standard-setting organizations COoperate with each other during the development and drafting of new standards.
The HDLC standard was the result of considerable effort aimed at developing a more efficient bit-oriented data link control procedure for synchronous communications. Although there has often been a strong overlap in the membership of related committees, the 1977 joint session between CClTT SG VI1 and the I S 0 working party charged with developing HDLC set a precedent for formal cooperation between these two standards organizations. Efforts to institutionalize this precedent failed until, under pressure from the EEC, the IS0 and the CCITT were able to harmonize their efforts to develop transport protocols in 1982.
Conclusion
The need to develop new computer communications standards has placed unprecedented demands on traditional standards setting processes. The development of Recommendation X.25 reflected this stress, and in the course of developing a standard, the key participants made significant changes to the process. Economic priorties were allowed t o override technical concerns and a weak standard rushed to agreement. The formal, plodding procedures of the CCITT were circumvented through informal meetings among the key parties. T o p managers, rather than technical specialists, sat in on the meetings and committed their organizations to an agreement. The principal of layering was employed for the first time, as well as an unusual degree of cooperation between CCITT and the 1SO.
Current standards efforts in such areas as videotex, local area networks, or electronic message services can be expected t o exhibit many of the same patterns of decision-making.
